The battle of Magersfontein, 11 December 1899, can be modelled as a hypergame. The analysis shows how British misconceptions of 1 he Boer strategies and strength led to an ill-advised British attack with disastrous results for them. Several points in connection with hypergames are illustrated in this case study.
in their study is that a major cause of the Allies' defeat lay in an overly simplistic view of the problem in which they assumed that the enemy perceived the military situation the same way as they did themselves. On the other hand the more imaginative of the German commanders were aware of the differences between the two sides' perceptions and put this awareness to devastating use.
The battle of Magcrsfontcin, 11 December 1899, provides another example of "'eh a situation. This battle in the Bocr War is interesting enough in itself to warrant its own case study. In comparison with Bennctt and Dando's study it also brings out the point more clearly that the preference orderings of the possible outcomes may vary considerably when evaluated .from different viewpoints.
Nevertheless the techniques used are the same as in Bennett and Dando'scase study.
http://orion.journals.ac.za/ [6] ) and eyewitness accounts (for example Totius [8] and those mentioned in Davill [3] and Spies (7] ). For example, the British ranking of the entries in the row for A4 in Figure 2 The game matrix has a unique stable solution for the strategy pair (A4; B2) in the sense that neither of the two sides would obtain a better ordering if it should decide unilaterally to change its strategy. This British viewpoint was defective on various counts. In the first place their estimate of the strength of the Bocr forces was approximately 50% too high. In the second place they did not notice several weak spots on Boer left flank. Their biggest mistake was that they missed an important Boer strategy, namely the use of trenches. At the insistence of General Koos de la Rey they had prepared a number of trenches, the most important of which were those just south of Magersfontein Hill.
Because of a number of reasons .the presence of these trenches was not di,covered by the British before the bailie.
Because or the three factors mentioned above the Boers' perception of the military situation ~iffered from those of the British. In terms of a hypergame analysis this can be modelled in two ways. In the http://orion.journals.ac.za/ The model in Figure 3 has the capacity to illustrate these aspects. If the column for B5 is removed from consideration the remaining game matrix has a stable solution for the strategy pair (A4; B3), which from the Boer viewpoint is not as advantageous as (A3; B5). Nevertheless the model shows that the British will select A4 if they are not aware of B5. Therefore the Bocrs select B5 in the expanded matrix, and against A4 this yields the best possible outcome for them.
The run of events in the real battle was that the British indeed chose A4 and the Boers B5, resulting in a terrible defeat for the British. A poignant counterpoint to the basic theme of misconception and war is provided by the little-known fact that the famous Afrikaans poet and theologian, Tot ius (.1 D du Toit), who was in the Bocr camp, directed his scripture reading from 2 Corinthians 5 and his sermon on the eve of the battle to the subject of reconciliation (Totius (81).
http://orion.journals.ac.za/ 
CONCLUSION
Hypergame analyses arc useful in situations where the conflicting parties have different perceptions of the strategies available to them and the payoffs that result from their interactions. The battle of Magcrsfontcin illustrates these points and serves as a grim reminder of the dire consequences that can result when a participant in a connict fails in his evaluation of his opponent.
